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ABSTRACT. Contractual estoppel has been developed in the context of 
the exclusion of liability for misrepresentation. It provides a legal 
explanation for the validity of ‘no representation’ and ‘no reliance’ 
clauses, which may contradict the true state of affairs and prevent a claim 
for misrepresentation arising. The importance of contractual estoppel 
does not end there for it may be applied more generally to prevent parties 
denying the existence of a state of affairs which was the basis of their 
contract. This paper seeks to answer two central questions that continue 
to trouble the courts, most commonly when a claim is based upon the 
alleged mis-selling of a financial product. The questions are: (1) What is 
the true nature of contractual estoppel? (2) Are ‘no representation’ and 
‘no reliance’ clauses subject to the test of reasonableness set out in the 
Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977, as extended to contractual terms which 
‘exclude or restrict’ liability for misrepresentation by s 3 of the 
Misrepresentation Act 1967? 
 
KEYWORDS: contractual estoppel, misrepresentation, reliance, 
exclusion clauses, basis clauses and the Misrepresentation Act 1967. 
 
Introduction 
 
1. The alleged mis-selling of financial products has generated a 
considerable amount of litigation in recent years. The buyer often alleges 
that he purchased the financial product from a bank as a result of express 
or implied misrepresentations about the product made by a salesman 
which induced him to enter into the contract. Further or alternatively, the 
claim might be based on a failure to advise, or at least to advise properly, 
as to the nature or suitability of the product. Usually this is coupled with 
an assertion that the bank owed the buyer a general duty to advise. The 
Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, and the conduct of business 
rules made pursuant to that Act, may come to the aid of an individual 
who purchases the product, and who usually meets the statutory 
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requirement of ‘private person’,1 but, thanks to a decision of David Steel 
J in Titan Steel Wheels Ltd v Royal Bank of Scotland plc,2 a corporate 
buyer purchasing a product ‘in the course of carrying on a business of any 
kind’ falls outside the definition of ‘private person’ and has no direct 
right of action under the statute.3 The corporate buyer is left to advance 
its claim at common law. This restriction applies just as much to a small, 
family run company, where, for example, a husband and wife are the sole 
directors and shareholders, as it does to a large corporation.   
 
2. When the corporate buyer brings its mis-selling claim at common law 
it usually loses, or at least it does where the bank that has sold the 
financial product can point to terms of its (usually) standard banking 
contract whereby the parties agree or acknowledge that no representations 
have been made (a ‘no representation’ clause), or that they have not relied 
on any representations that have been made (a ‘no reliance’ clause), or 
which otherwise seek to establish the basis of the relationship between 
the buyer and the seller, for example, by providing that the buyer was a 
‘sophisticated’ investor who understood the nature of the investment and 
was aware of (and accepted) the risks involved, and/or that the 
transaction was ‘execution only’ and that no advisory duty arose or had 
arisen in the past. ‘No representation’ and ‘no reliance’ clauses are 
included in the contract to protect the bank from potential liability for 
misrepresentation and supplement the protection offered by a ‘pure’ 
entire agreement clause, again a usual feature of a standard banking 
contract, which merely denies contractual effect to any promise made by 
                                           
1 See the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Rights of Action) Regulations 
2001, SI 2001/2256, reg 3. 
2 [2010] EWHC 211 (Comm), [2010] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 92 at [68]-[70]. 
3 Under the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, s 138D (prior to April 1, 2013, 
this was found in s 150 of the Act). Cf Flex-E-Vouchers Ltd v Royal Bank of Scotland 
plc [2016] EWHC 2604 (Ch) at [19], HH Judge Waksman QC, sitting in the High 
Court: ‘[i]n certain limited circumstances, a complaint can be made to the financial 
ombudsman, but, more importantly, a complaint can be made to the FCA, which has 
the power to impose disciplinary sanctions…it would be quite wrong to suggest that a 
complainant is left without any realistic recourse, even if not able to bring a claim for 
breach of statutory duty.’ 
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the bank outside the written agreement.4 A ‘pure’ entire agreement does 
not protect against liability for misrepresentation.5  
 
3. This rough and ready summary provides the context for what is to be 
discussed in this paper, which can be broken down into two broad 
questions: 
 
(1) What is the legal mechanism by which the buyer’s claim for 
misrepresentation is defeated by ‘no representation’ and ‘no 
reliance’ clauses?  
 
(2) Whether such clauses are subject to the reasonableness test found 
in the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977, as extended to contract 
terms which ‘exclude or restrict’ liability for misrepresentation 
through s 3 of the Misrepresentation Act 1967? 
 
Estoppel by representation  
 
4. ‘No representation’ and ‘no reliance’ clauses may bar the buyer’s 
misrepresentation claim because they remove one or more of the essential 
pillars upon which that claim must be based. The most obvious (and 
uncontroversial) explanation for this is through the operation of an 
estoppel by representation (of which evidential estoppel is an example) 
which prevents the buyer from denying that no representation was made 
or that he did not rely on any representation that might have been made. 
However, the seller will usually have a problem relying on estoppel by 
representation because he is required to show that he relied on the buyer’s 
counter-representation contained in the ‘no representation’ or ‘no 
reliance’ clauses, and he may not be able to do that if it is clear that he 
did make the representation and it was intended that the buyer should rely 
on it.6 Nevertheless, it is worth remembering that, in the right (perhaps 
                                           
4 There will be no further discussion of entire agreement clauses in this paper because, 
unlike a ‘no representation’ or ‘no reliance’ clause, they do not preclude the 
admission of facts but merely deny substantive effect to a promise made outside the 
written agreement.  
5 The precise wording of the clause will need to be construed in order to determine its 
scope: see, eg, AXA Sun Life Service plc v Campbell Martin Ltd [2011] EWCA Civ 
133, [2011] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 1. 
6 Lowe v Lombank Ltd [1960] 1 WLR 196, 205, Diplock J (in the Court of Appeal). 
See also Chadwick LJ in EA Grimstead & Son Ltd v McGarrigan [1998-99] Info TLR 
384, 412, and in Watford Electronics Ltd v Sanderson CFL Ltd [2001] EWCA Civ 
317, [2001] 1 All ER (Comm) 696 at [40]. See also A Trukhtanov, 
‘Misrepresentation: Acknowledgment of Non-Reliance as a Defence’ (2009) 125 
LQR 648, 651-653. 
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rare) circumstances, estoppel by representation may be decisive of the 
issue quite independently of any alternative explanation as to why such a 
clause can contradict the truth (known to the seller) that a representation 
has been made and the buyer has relied on it.7 How is this ‘magic’, some 
might say ‘black magic’, worked? 
 
Contractual estoppel 
 
5. The explanation is said to turn on what has been called the doctrine of 
‘contractual estoppel’. Contractual estoppel facilitates the enforcement of 
an agreement on the state of facts by precluding proof of facts that 
contradict that agreement. The key decision is Peekay Intermark Ltd v 
Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd,8 where the Court of 
Appeal considered the effect of a term, in a contract for the sale and 
purchase of a financial product, which stated that the ‘sophisticated’ 
investor had read the risk disclosure statement provided by the bank and 
fully understood the nature of the transaction and the risk. Moore-Bick LJ 
said that:9 
 
‘There is no reason in principle why parties to a contract should not 
agree that a certain state of affairs should form the basis of the 
transaction, whether it be the case or not. For example, it may be 
desirable to settle a disagreement as to an existing state of affairs in 
order to establish a clear basis for the contract itself and its 
subsequent performance. Where parties express an agreement of 
that kind in a contractual document neither can subsequently deny 
the existence of the facts and matters upon which they have agreed, 
at least as far as concerns those aspects of their relationship to 
which the agreement was directed. The contract itself gave rise to 
an estoppel: see Colchester Borough Council v Smith [1991] Ch 
448, affirmed on appeal [1992] Ch 421.’ 
 
6. It has been argued that Moore-Bick LJ’s statement was merely obiter 
or, alternatively, per incuriam, but those arguments have been rejected by 
                                           
7 Peekay Intermark Ltd v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd [2006] 
EWCA Civ 386, [2006] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 511 at [57], Moore-Bick LJ: ‘A clause of that 
kind may (depending on its terms) also be capable of giving rise to an estoppel by 
representation if the necessary elements can be established.’ See also Trident 
Turboprop (Dublin) Ltd v First Flight Couriers Ltd [2008] EWHC 1686 (Comm), 
[2008] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 581 at [35], Aikens J. 
8 [2006] EWCA Civ 386, [2006] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 511. 
9 At [56].  
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the courts.10 If there was any doubt as to the status of Moore-Bick LJ’s 
statement, it was removed by Aikens LJ in Springwell Navigation Corp v 
JP Morgan Chase, who said it was ‘consistent with principle and 
authority’.11 Aikens LJ also confirmed that contractual estoppel operated 
as a ‘separate doctrine’:12 (1) there is no requirement of reliance or 
detrimental reliance with contractual estoppel, which makes it different 
from estoppel by representation;13 (2) the party relying on the estoppel 
does not have to show that it would be unconscionable for the other party 
to resile from the agreed state of affairs, which makes it different from 
estoppel by (non-contractual) convention;14 and (3) the representation of 
fact is enforceable only because it forms part of the contract between the 
parties.  
 
Commercial justification  
 
7. ‘No representation’ and ‘no reliance’ clauses can be justified on 
commercial grounds. First, they bring greater commercial certainty for 
‘there is commercial utility in such clauses being enforceable, so that the 
parties know precisely the basis on which they are entering into their 
contractual relationship’.15 They bring greater certainty by maintaining 
the integrity of the written agreement. In Inntrepreneur Pub Co (GL) v 
East Crown Ltd,16 Lightman J famously said that an entire agreement 
clause (which, in its extended form, can include ‘no representation’ and 
‘no reliance’ elements) is designed to stop a party ‘thr[a]shing through 
the undergrowth and finding in the course of negotiations some (chance) 
remark or statement (often long forgotten or difficult to recall or explain) 
on which to found a claim’ based on breach of warranty (or, we may add, 
for misrepresentation, where the clause is in its extended form). In most 
                                           
10 For dismissal of the obiter argument, see Springwell Navigation Corp v JP Morgan 
Chase [2008] EWHC 1186 (Comm) at [556]-[561], Gloster J; Raiffeisen Zentralbank 
Osterreich v Royal Bank of Scotland plc [2010] EWHC 1392 (Comm), [2011] 1 
Lloyd’s Rep 123 at [241], Christopher Clarke J. For dismissal of the per incuriam 
argument, see Springwell [2008] EWHC 1186 (Comm) at [562], Gloster J, and on 
appeal [2010] EWCA Civ 1221, [2010] 2 CLC 705 at [169], Aikens LJ. 
11 [2010] EWCA Civ 1221 at [169]. 
12 At [177] (where he was distinguishing the doctrine from estoppel by convention).  
13 Springwell [2008] EWHC 1186 (Comm) at [556]-[563], Gloster J; Credit Suisse 
International v Stichting Vestia Groep [2014] EWHC 3103 (Comm) at [309], Andrew 
Smith J. Trukhtanov (2009) 125 LQR 648, 656-657, says that the ‘reliance doctrine’ 
is the foundation for estoppel both by convention and representation. 
14 Springwell [2010] EWCA Civ 1221 at [177], Aikens LJ. 
15 Springwell at [144], Aikens LJ. See also the example given by Moore-Bick LJ in 
Peekay at [56] (and quoted in para 5 above). 
16 [2000] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 611, 614. 
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cases, this reduces the risk of litigation.17 Secondly, such clauses allow 
for the efficient allocation of risk between the contracting parties, as ‘it is 
reasonable to assume that the price to be paid reflects the commercial risk 
which each party – or, more usually, the purchaser – is willing to 
accept’.18  
 
True nature of the doctrine 
 
8. Contractual estoppel has been described as an ‘anomalous doctrine’.19 
It does not share the requirements of estoppel by representation (reliance 
or detrimental reliance) or estoppel by non-contractual convention 
(unconscionability) because they are types of equitable estoppel and 
contractual estoppel is a common law doctrine. The relationship between 
contractual estoppel and estoppel by deed (also a common law doctrine20) 
is less certain. Estoppel by deed means that a person who executed a deed 
is held bound by its recitals even though they contradict the actual state of 
affairs.21 Originally, the rule was based on the solemnity of a deed,22 but 
Lord Toulson recently stated, when delivering the advice of the Privy 
Council in Prime Sight Ltd v Lavarello, that estoppel by deed, like ‘any 
other express or implied contractual convention … accords with the 
principle of party autonomy which underlies the common law of 
contract’.23 Alexander Trukhtanov goes so far as to argue that, although 
Lord Toulson does not mention ‘Springwell-based contractual estoppel’ 
by name in Lavarello, ‘the same concept is clearly in play’.24 
                                           
17 Foodco UK LLP v Henry Boot Development Ltd [2010] EWHC 358 (Ch) at 
[177(i)], Lewison J. The number of cases referred to in this paper shows that the 
laudable aim of reducing the risk of litigation is not always achieved. 
18 EA Grimstead & Son Ltd v McGarrigan [1998-99] Info TLR 384, 413, Chadwick 
LJ, and cited by his Lordship in Watford Electronics Ltd v Sanderson CFL Ltd [2001] 
EWCA Civ 317, [2001] 1 All ER (Comm) 696 at [39]. See also Raiffeisen 
Zentralbank Osterreich v Royal Bank of Scotland plc [2010] EWHC 1392 (Comm), 
[2011] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 123 at [327], Christopher Clarke J. 
19 S Wilken and K Ghaly, The Law of Waiver, Variation, and Estoppel (3rd ed, 2012), 
[13.16]. 
20 KR Handley, Estoppel by Conduct and Election (2nd ed, 2016), [7-001]. 
21 The editors of Spencer Bower on Estoppel by Representation (4th ed, 2004), at 
VIII.13.3, note that the position has changed over time, and submit that ‘the operative 
words of a deed may, if they necessarily imply a convention as to a matter of fact or 
law, found an estoppel’. 
22 Goodtitle ex d Edwards v Bailey (1777) 2 Cowp 597, 601, Lord Mansfield. 
23 [2013] UKPC 22, [2014] AC 436 at [46]. The Privy Council held that a receipt 
clause in a deed raised an estoppel against the payee despite an admission that no 
payment had been made. 
24 A Trukhtanov, ‘Receipt Clauses: From Estoppel by Deed to Contractual Estoppel’ 
(2014) 130 LQR 3, 5; and see also (2009) 125 LQR 648, 665. The editors of Spencer 
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9. Professor Gerrard McMeel has argued, in forceful terms, that because 
contractual estoppel appears, by stealth, to subsume the more narrowly 
formulated estoppel by deed, it is ‘an illegitimate species of estoppel’, 
and the cases that have established the doctrine are per incuriam because 
they ignore established authority (especially Greer v Kettle25) supporting 
estoppel by deed.26 However, in Lavarello, Lord Toulson rejected the 
idea that estoppel by deed should be abandoned, and proposed to retain it 
because of the ‘particular characteristic’ of a deed that it requires no 
consideration.27 But, as Lord Toulson added: ‘where there is a contractual 
convention, it makes no difference in principle whether or not the 
contract is embodied in a deed.’ A case of ‘pure’ estoppel by deed, where 
there is no consideration, is likely to be rare; nevertheless, as Trukhtanov 
observes, the continued recognition of estoppel by deed ‘enables it to 
raise an estoppel where a non-contractual convention could not without 
subverting the doctrine of consideration’.28 Consequently, although 
estoppel by deed and contractual estoppel may share a common 
foundation based on freedom of contract/party autonomy,29 it is submitted 
that McMeel is wrong to say that the former has been subsumed by the 
latter, and the fact that the cases on estoppel by deed were not analysed 
by the Court of Appeal Peekay and Springwell does not make those 
decisions per incuriam. 
 
10. The ‘doctrine’ of contractual estoppel has been misdescribed. The use 
of the term ‘estoppel’ is ‘confusing’.30 It is not an established form of 
estoppel at all. The term ‘contractual estoppel’ should either be properly 
explained or, better still, abandoned and replaced by a more appropriate 
term, such as ‘contractual preclusion’ or ‘preclusion by agreement’.31 
                                                                                                                        
Bower on Estoppel by Representation (4th ed, 2004), at VIII.7.1 (and at VIII.13.1) 
also submit that ‘an estoppel by deed, properly analysed, is simply a contractual 
provision by which the parties and their successors are bound’. 
25 [1938] AC 156, 171, Lord Maugham. 
26 G McMeel, ‘Documentary Fundamentalism in the Senior Courts’ [2011] LMCLQ 
185, 206-207; G McMeel, ‘Banks, the Judiciary and “Documentary 
Fundamentalism”’, Counsel, April 2015, 10-12. Contrast, Trukhtanov (2009) 125 
LQR 648 at 665-666, Trukhtanov, ‘Limits of Contractual Estoppel’ [2012] LMCLQ 
358, 361-363, Trukhtanov (2014) 130 LQR 3, 5. 
27 [2013] UKPC 22 at [30]. 
28 Trukhtanov (2014) 130 LQR 3, 6. 
29 Prime Sight Ltd v Lavarello [2013] UKPC 22 at [46]-[47], Lord Toulson. 
30 P Feltham, D Hochberg and T Leech, Spencer Bower on Estoppel by 
Representation (4th ed, 2004), at VIII.7.1. 
31 Note that the trial judge in Colchester BC v Smith [1991] Ch 448, 493, cited a 
passage from the third edition (1977) of Spencer Bower on Estoppel by 
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Laymen and Scottish lawyers would no doubt feel more at home with that 
description! But the real advantage is that it would distinguish between 
the key requirements of the common law doctrine (agreement of the 
parties) and those that lie at the heart of equitable estoppel (detrimental 
reliance and unconscionability). Despite making this suggestion, it will 
probably cause less confusion if, for the purposes of this paper, we 
continue to refer to ‘contractual estoppel’.  
 
11. How is contractual estoppel to be explained if not as an established 
type of estoppel? The starting point is that ‘no representation’, ‘no 
reliance’ and similar clauses that set out the basis of the relationship 
between the contracting parties, are contractual terms which bind the 
parties like other contract terms. This has led some to argue that, to the 
extent that a party to the contract seeks to assert contrary facts, there is a 
breach of contract. However, because a court will not allow a party to 
benefit from its own wrong, including its own breach of contract, that 
party will be prevented from asserting contrary facts. This is the view of 
Sean Wilken QC and Karim Ghaly,32 whose analysis was adopted by 
Andrew Smith J in Credit Suisse International v Stichting Vestia Groep, 
when he held that contractual estoppel can arise where the parties have 
made an agreement about a state of affairs in the future.33 Wilken and 
Ghaly explain the true nature of the doctrine as follows:34 
 
‘Peekay, if it cannot be justified by recourse to an estoppel, has to 
be justified by some other means. The most obvious means is 
contractual. Since the parties have agreed X to be the case, then the 
party which denies that X is in fact the case is in breach of 
contract. The Courts will not permit a party to benefit from its own 
wrong – including its own breach of contract. The Peekay 
contractual estoppel would be a reflection of that principle.’ 
 
                                                                                                                        
Representation, para 158, where there is a reference to being ‘precluded, as a matter 
of contract, by operative words’. By analogy, see the reference to ‘precluded’ in s 
21(1) of the Sale of Goods Act 1979 (‘…the buyer acquires no better title to the goods 
than the seller had, unless the owner of the goods is by his conduct precluded from 
denying the seller’s authority to sell.’). It is submitted that ‘precluded by signature’ is 
too narrow as there may be an oral agreement, or an agreement by conduct, on 
standard terms. The term ‘contractual convention’ is more acceptable, but runs the 
risk that it will be confused with a ‘non-contractual convention’ which requires a 
finding of unconscionability. 
32 S Wilken and K Ghaly, The Law of Waiver, Variation and Estoppel (3rd ed, 2012), 
at [13.24]. 
33 [2014] EWHC 3103 (Comm) at [309]. 
34 N 32 above. 
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12. Professor Andrew Burrows says that if we are seeking to defend the 
language of estoppel, we might say that its importance, going beyond the 
normal consequences of breach of a term, is that it explains there being a 
rule of evidence (which cannot be explained by the ordinary rules as to 
breach) that the party cannot deny that the state of affairs is different than 
warranted.35 However, the response is provided by Burrows himself when 
he says that ‘a contrary, and probably preferable, view is that the 
language of estoppel here reflects nothing more than the idea that a party 
may be prevented by a court from being in breach of contract and that the 
concept of a contractual estoppel is unnecessary and unhelpful’.36  
 
13. How will a court prevent the party from being in breach of contract? 
There is no suggestion in the contractual estoppel cases that a court was 
willing to grant injunctive relief or make an order for specific 
performance. But there are plenty of examples of the courts being willing 
to prevent a party from taking advantage of his own breach of contract, 
when the court employs a restrictive construction of a contract term,37 or 
implies a term into the contract,38 to prevent that happening. There is also 
an analogous rule that one party will not do anything ‘of his own motion’ 
to put an end to any state of circumstances on which the performance of 
the contract depends.39 There may even be a more general principle that 
‘[a] man cannot be permitted to take advantage of his own wrong’.40 
 
14. Is this a satisfactory explanation? It is submitted that it is not. First, it 
is an (overly) elaborate explanation which takes the idea that a party may 
not rely on his own breach into an area where it has not been used before. 
Secondly, it assumes that there will be a breach of contract whenever one 
party claims that the facts were not as stated in the ‘no representation’ or 
‘no reliance’ clause. In Photo Production Ltd v Securicor Ltd,41 Lord 
Diplock famously stated that [e]very failure to perform a primary 
obligation is a breach of contract’, but with a ‘no representation’ or ‘no 
reliance’ clause there is real difficulty in identifying a primary (in the 
                                           
35 A Burrows, A Restatement of the English Law of Contract (2016), p 79; J Beatson, 
A Burrows and J Cartwright, Anson’s Law of Contract (30th ed, 2016), p 136. 
36 Anson, p 136. Burrows seems to be hardening his earlier view expressed in the 
commentary to his Restatement at p 79, where ‘probably preferable’ is omitted. 
37 See Alghussein Establishment v Eton College [1988] 1 WLR 587. 
38 See BDW Trading Ltd v JM Rowe Investments Ltd [2011] EWCA Civ 548 at [34]. 
39 Stirling v Maitland (1864) 5 B & S 840; CEL Group Ltd v Nedlloyd Lines UK Ltd 
[2003] Civ 1716, [2004] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 381 at [11]. 
40 H Beale et al (eds), Chitty on Contracts (32 ed, 2015), Vol 1, [13-085] and cases 
cited therein. 
41 [1980] AC 827, 849. 
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sense of promissory) obligation that has been breached.42 Thirdly, it is 
telling that, in Peekay, Chadwick LJ held that the relevant provisions 
operated as a contractual estoppel to prevent Peekay (the investor) from 
‘asserting in litigation’ that it had not in fact read and understood the risk 
disclosure statement.43 Trukhtanov makes the point that contractual 
estoppel is ‘merely a piece of procedural machinery to the use of which a 
party is entitled simply by virtue of a binding agreement’.44 On this basis, 
there is no need to employ an explanation based on the prevention of a 
party from taking advantage of his own wrongdoing. It is submitted that 
where a ‘no representation’ or ‘no reliance’ clause is construed as giving 
rise to a binding contractual term, a party is precluded by that contractual 
term alone from asserting contrary facts. The court’s duty, which is 
derived from the principle of freedom of contract/party autonomy, is to 
enforce contractual terms and, based on Lord Toulson’s judgment in 
Lavarello, a declaratory statement of fact intended to be contractually 
binding is just such a term and must be enforced.45  
 
Lowe v Lombank 
 
15. Critics of the doctrine of contractual estoppel say that it allows the 
contracting parties to create ‘a parallel factual universe, that may be 
wholly at odds with reality and truth but nevertheless binding’, which can 
lead to unfairness where one is not dealing with sophisticated commercial 
parties of equal bargaining power.46  
 
16. Lowe v Lombank Ltd47 does not fit easily, if at all, into the ‘virtual’ 
world created by contractual estoppel. A 65 year old widow bought a 
motor car on hire purchase. The salesman described it as ‘perfect’ or 
‘near perfect’. In fact it was unroadworthy and dangerous. Clause 9(ii) of 
the HP agreement, which she did not read and he did not explain, 
provided that the hirer acknowledged and agreed that she had examined 
                                           
42 It might be said that a contractual obligation could arise through an implied term. 
But the test for implication of a term based on the intention of the parties is severe and 
not easily met, especially in the case of a detailed contract between commercial 
parties: see Marks & Spencer plc v BNP Paribas Securities Services Trust Co (Jersey) 
Ltd [2015] UKSC 72, [2016] AC 742.  
43 [2006] EWCA Civ 386 at [70]. See also J Braithwaite, ‘The Origins and 
Implications of Contractual Estoppel’ (2016) 132 LQR 120, 146. 
44 Trukhtanov (2009) 125 LQR 648, 657. 
45 Prime Sight Ltd v Lavarello [2013] UKPC 2 at [46]-[47], Lord Toulson; and 
adopting the analysis provided by Trukhtanov (2014) 130 LQR 3, 4. 
46 P Marshall, ‘Humpty Dumpty is broken: “unsuitable” and “inappropriate” swap 
transactions’ [2014] JIBFL 679, 680, 683. 
47 [1960] 1 WLR 196. 
 11 
the goods prior to the signing of the agreement; and they were of 
merchantable quality and that she had not ‘made known to the owners 
expressly or by implication the particular purpose for which the goods are 
required and that the goods are reasonably fit for the purpose for which 
they are in fact required’. She also signed a delivery receipt which 
contained a statement that she acknowledged that she had read the whole 
agreement and that she had examined the goods and that they were in 
good order and condition. Later the widow claimed damages for breach 
of the implied condition of fitness for purpose under s 8(2) of the Hire 
Purchase Act 1938. The hire purchase company argued unsuccessfully 
that she was estopped from relying on any such implied condition. 
 
17. Diplock J, sitting in the Court of Appeal, said:48 
 
‘To call [Clause 9(ii)] an agreement as well as an acknowledgment 
by the plaintiff cannot convert a statement as to past facts, known 
by both parties to be untrue, into a contractual obligation, which is 
essentially a promise by the promisor to the promisee that acts will 
be done in the future or that facts exist at the time of the promise or 
will exist in the future. To say that the hirer “agrees’ that he has not 
done something in the past means no more than that the hirer, at the 
request of the owner, represents that he has not done that thing in 
the past. If intended by the hirer to be acted upon by the person to 
whom the representation is made, believed to be true by such 
person and acted upon by such person to his detriment, it can give 
rise to an estoppel: it cannot give rise to any positive contractual 
rights.’ 
 
18. Judges have had to ‘explain away’ Diplock J’s statement as obiter 
when endorsing the concept of contractual estoppel. In Springwell,49 
Gloster J said that his Lordship was considering whether or not the 
agreement between the plaintiff and the hire-purchase company was a 
‘sham’ of the kind he subsequently discussed in Snook v London & West 
Riding Investments Ltd.50 On appeal in the same case, Aiken LJ 
disagreed,51 and said that Diplock J’s statement was not binding because 
it was not necessary for the decision in that case, which was based on an 
                                           
48 At 204. 
49 [2008] EWHC 1186 (Comm) at [550]. 
50 [1967] 2 QB 786, CA. Trukhtanov (2009) 125 LQR 648, 658, n 49, submits that 
there was no sham in Lowe as there was no ‘common intention’. 
51 [2010] EWCA Civ 1221 at [151]-[153], [155]-[156] and [169]. Aikens LJ (at [151]) 
also disagreed with Christopher Clarke J’s analysis of Lowe v Lombank in Raiffeisen 
[2010] EWHC 1392 (Comm) at [252]. 
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application of the anti-avoidance provisions in s 8(3) of the Hire Purchase 
Act 1938,  and that it was inconsistent with Burrough’s Adding Machines 
Ltd v Aspinall.52  
 
19. This paper does not consider in any detail whether or not Lowe v 
Lombank, which was not cited to the Court of Appeal in Peekay, deals a 
fatal blow to the doctrine of contractual estoppel. The issue has been 
exhaustively debated in the academic journals.53 It will now take a 
decision of the Supreme Court to reverse the Court of Appeal’s 
endorsement of the doctrine of contractual estoppel. Nevertheless, the 
way Diplock J’s statement in Lowe v Lombank was distinguished in the 
contractual estoppel cases does raise some fundamental questions. First, 
Peekay and Springwell appear to blur the line previously drawn between 
a warranty, which is a contractual promise, and a representation, which is 
a statement of fact or law.54 The courts have recently been keen to draw 
that line when rejecting claims made by a buyer of a business that 
warranties given by the seller, in the sale and purchase agreement (SPA), 
contained implied representations of fact that gave the buyer a cause of 
action for misrepresentation (the claim for breach of contract being time-
barred under the SPA).55 Andrew Smith J drew the same line in Vestia56 
when he said that ‘[m]ere representations do not … engage the principle 
of contractual estoppel.’ There must be a contractual obligation for the 
estoppel to bite on, and if it cannot be found there can be no contractual 
estoppel.57 This takes us back to the problem raised by Diplock J: is a 
statement as to past facts, known by both parties to be untrue, a mere 
representation or does it give rise to a contractual obligation? Secondly, if 
we are to treat a contractually agreed state of affairs as precluding one or 
both parties from alleging that the actual facts are inconsistent with the 
                                           
52 (1925) 41 TLR 276. 
53 See, in particular, McMeel [2011] LMCLQ 185, 191; Trukhtanov (2009) 125 LQR 
648, 649; Braithwaite (2016) 132 LQR 120, 127. 
54 Idemitsu Kosan Co Ltd v Sumitomo Corp [2016] EWHC 1909 (Comm) at [14], A 
Baker QC, sitting as a Deputy High Court judge. See also D O’Sullivan, S Elliott and 
R Zakrzewski, The Law of Rescission (2nd ed, 2014), [4.17]. 
55 Idemitsu Kosan Co Ltd v Sumitomo Corp [2016] EWHC 1909 (Comm) at [13]-[21]; 
Sycamore Bidco Ltd v Breslin [2012] EWHC 3443 (Ch) at [200]-[211]; cf Invertec 
Ltd v De Mol Holding BV [2009] EWHC 2471 (Ch) at [362]-[363]. Of course, the 
seller may expressly ‘represent and warrant’, but this is less common in SPAs than it 
is, eg, in standard form syndicated loan agreements. 
56 Credit Suisse International v Stichting Vestia Groep [2014] EWHC 3103 (Comm) 
at [303]. 
57 See, eg, Police and Crime Commission for Greater Manchester v Butterworth, 
unreported, 10th November 2016, at [29], J Crow QC, sitting as a Deputy High Court 
judge. 
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state of affairs so specified in the contract, does this mean that the 
estoppel that comes into existence has the potential itself to give rise to a 
cause of action, in other words can it be used as a ‘sword’ and not just as 
a ‘shield’? Of course, at one level, the question is pointless, because 
contractual estoppel is not a form of estoppel at all.58 Proper construction 
of the statement contained in the contract becomes essential. For 
example, where the statement contains a promise that a state of affairs 
does or will exist then it is likely to be construed as a warranty. A 
statement as to past facts may also constitute a warranty, but that does not 
automatically follow and, despite Peekay and Springwell, it remains open 
for argument in the Supreme Court whether such a statement should 
operate as a contractual obligation when both parties know it to be 
untrue.59  
 
Has there been agreement? 
 
20. If we accept that there is a doctrine of ‘contractual estoppel’, the 
central question is whether the ‘no representation’ and ‘no reliance’ 
clauses have been agreed by the parties. There is no (black or white) 
magic in that question. The objective principle of contract formation is 
clear. If you sign a contract then you are bound by it, whether or not you 
have read the terms of the contract: this is the ‘signature rule’ enshrined 
in L’Estrange v Graucob.60 That is what a reasonable person would 
expect from the representation that you have made by signing something 
that was, or appeared to be, a contractual document. Of course, there are 
exceptions to the signature rule when the contract is rendered voidable 
for, for example, misrepresentation, duress or undue influence, or void 
for mistake (including the doctrine of non est factum). There have been 
attempts over the years to water down the signature rule. It was famously 
argued by Professor John Spencer that the rule should not apply where 
one party knows (or ought to know) that the other has not read the terms 
and that he would not have agreed to them.61 But this approach has not 
                                           
58 Burton J stated in NRAM plc v McAdam [2014] EWHC 4174 (Comm), [2015] 1 All 
ER (Comm) 1239 at [14(iii)(a)], revsd on appeal [2015] EWCA Civ 451, that a 
contractual estoppel, like an estoppel by convention, could only be used as a ‘shield 
not a sword’. Cf Chitty on Contracts (32nd ed, 2015), Vol 1, [4-116, n 693]. 
59 Cf Raiffeisen Zentralbank Osterreich AG v Royal Bank of Scotland plc [2010] 
EWHC 1392 (Comm) at [250]-[255], Christopher Clarke J. 
60 [1934] 2 KB 394, 403, Scrutton LJ. 
61 JR Spencer, ‘Signature, Consent, and the Rule in L’Estrange v Graucob’ [1973] 
CLJ 104. For a similar argument, see also D McLauchlan, ‘The Entire Agreement 
Clause: Conclusive or a Question of Weight?’ (2012) 128 LQR 521. Recently, 
Leggatt J tentatively questioned whether there is a limited exception to the objective 
approach to contract formation when one party knows, or ought reasonably to know, 
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generally found favour on these shores.62 In Peekay, Moore-Bick LJ 
endorsed a robust approach to the signature rule when he said that:63 
 
‘It is an important principle of English law which underpins the 
whole of commercial life; any erosion of it would have 
repercussions far beyond the business community.’ 
 
21. The temptation is to be sympathetic to the needs of the buyer in a 
mis-selling case, especially where the ‘buyer’ is, in effect (if not in law), 
the husband and wife team who are sole directors and shareholders of a 
small company, and it becomes clear on the facts that misrepresentations 
were made and relied upon. But the signature rule should continue to be 
applied rigorously. There are many points of contract law that would 
come as a complete surprise to the reasonable man or woman travelling 
on a bus in Poplar,64 perhaps the rule that you can be bound by your oral 
agreement is one of them, but it is highly likely that the reasonable man 
or woman well knows that by signing something that is, or reasonably 
appears to be, a contractual document, you risk being bound by its terms.  
 
22. The real problem arises where the buyer is misled into signing 
something. ‘No representation’ and ‘no reliance’ clauses in the contract 
arguably prevent the buyer setting aside the contract even though he has 
actually been misled. In Peekay, Moore-Bick LJ left the door open to 
rescission of the whole agreement when he said:65 
 
‘The effectiveness of a clause of that kind [a ‘no reliance’ clause] 
may be challenged on the ground that the contract as a whole, 
including the clause in question, can be avoided if in fact one or 
other of the parties was induced to enter it by misrepresentation.’ 
                                                                                                                        
that the other has no subjective intention to be bound: see Novus Aviation Ltd v Alubaf 
Arab International Bank BSC(c) [2016] EWHC 1575 (Comm) at [54]-[59]. 
62 By way of exception, see Sir Edward Eveleigh in Lloyds Bank plc v Waterhouse 
[1993] 2 FLR 97, CA. In Morgan v Pooley [2010] EWHC 2447 (QB) at [14], 
Edwards-Stuart J said that if the clause (in that case a ‘no reliance’ clause) was not 
one of which it might be reasonable to expect the representee to be aware, it cannot be 
invoked because it is contained in the very contract which is to be avoided for 
misrepresentation. For examples of foreign courts taking a less strict approach to the 
signature rule, see Tilden Rent-A-Car Co v Clendenning (1978) 83 DLR (3d) 400 
(Ont CA); Als Memasa v UBS AG [2012] SGCAS 43 (Sing CA), noted by SA 
Booysen, ‘Rethinking the Signature Rule’ [2013] LMCLQ 21. 
63 [2006] EWCA Civ 386 at [43]. 
64 Too many lawyers and investment bankers now live in Clapham for it to continue 
to be useful for these purposes!  
65 [2006] EWCA Civ 386 at [57]. 
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But he then made reference to the fact that a clause in the contract might 
alter that state of affairs. He continued:66 
 
‘However, I can see no reason in principle why it should not be 
possible for parties to an agreement to give up any right to assert 
that they were induced to enter into it by misrepresentation, 
provided that they make their intention clear, or why a clause of 
that kind, if properly drafted, should not give rise to a contractual 
estoppel of the kind recognized in Colchester BC v Smith.’ 
 
23. Later in his judgment, Moore-Bick LJ referred to that fact that there 
had been no suggestion that the bank had misrepresented ‘the effect’ of 
the documents which gave rise to the contractual estoppel.67 In 
Springwell, Aikens LJ said that it was not asserted in Peekay that the 
bank had misrepresented ‘the nature’ of the documents.68 In Cassa di 
Risparmio della Repubblica di San Marino SpA v Barclays Bank plc,69 
Hamblin J said that these authorities established that ‘[t]he principle [of 
contractual estoppel] may not apply where there has been a 
misrepresentation as to the effect of the contractual documents which 
give rise to the estoppel’. 
 
24. These cases seems to suggest that where the misrepresentation is as to 
the ‘contents’ or ‘effect’ of the contract documents, as opposed to a 
misrepresentation about the nature or suitability of the financial product 
itself, then the buyer should still be able to rescind the contract despite 
the presence of a ‘no representation’ or ‘no reliance’ clause. The 
misrepresentation must be as to the contents or effect of one or more of 
the clauses in the contract. But does it matter which clause the 
misrepresentation relates to? If it relates to the ‘no representation’ or ‘no 
reliance’ clauses then we do not have a problem, although such cases will 
be rare as the parties themselves are unlikely to focus on ‘boilerplate’ 
clauses in their pre-contractual negotiations – that is what the lawyers are 
for! In such a case, even if rescission is no longer possible, a court can 
adopt the approach taken by the Court of Appeal in Curtis v Chemical 
Cleaning and Dyeing Co and deny effect to the clause.70 The problem 
                                           
66 Ibid. 
67 At [60]. 
68 [2010] EWCA Civ 1221 at [166]. 
69 [2011] EWHC 484 (Comm) at [505]. 
70 [1951] 1 KB 805. See KR Handley, Spencer Bower and Handley on Actionable 
Misrepresentation (5th ed, 2014), [18.11]: ‘This must depend on the contract being 
notionally rectified.’ Cf the narrow explanation of Curtis provided by Rix LJ (obiter) 
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arises where the misrepresentation relates to some other clause. The ‘no 
representation’ and ‘no reliance’ clauses remain active and so it can be 
argued that there is no ‘misrepresentation’ (or reliance) at all. The 
distinction is sound in principle. It denies effect to a ‘no representation’ 
or ‘no reliance’ clause when the misrepresentation is about that very 
clause, but upholds freedom of contract, and allows a contracting party to 
rely on those clauses, when the ‘misrepresentation’ relates to some other 
clause.71 Otherwise, the commercial advantages of ‘no representation’ 
and ‘no reliance’ clauses, as well as entire agreement clauses generally, 
will be lost if they are abandoned in the very circumstances that they are 
most useful.   
 
Common law protection 
 
25. There is something ‘Denningesque’ about the way the courts have 
tried to redress the balance when faced with contractual estoppel. Just as 
Lord Denning battled against exclusion clauses in the days before the 
Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 by invoking legitimate common law 
concepts of incorporation and construction (and even the illegitimate one 
of ‘fundamental breach’), the courts have marshalled the same concepts 
to control the reach of contractual estoppel.  
 
26. First, incorporation of the relevant ‘disclaimers’ into the contract may 
be in issue. In Taberna Europe CDO II plc v Selskabet (In Bankruptcy),72 
industry standard ‘no representation’ and ‘no reliance’ disclaimers in 
investor presentation roadshow slides were held by Eder J not to be part 
of issuer-investor subordinated notes contract and so contractual estoppel 
did not arise. Secondly, following construction of the clause in question, 
the court may hold that the clause is being relied upon for a different 
                                                                                                                        
in AXA Sun Life Service plc v Campbell Martin Ltd [2011] EWCA Civ 133, [2011] 2 
Lloyd’s Rep 1 at [100]-[105], based on the judgment of Somervell LJ, which Rix LJ 
said represented the ratio of Curtis. 
71 It could not be said that a misrepresentation about another clause allows the 
representee to rescind the whole contract, including the ‘no representation’ and ‘no 
reliance’ clauses, because that is the very thing that those clauses are designed to 
prevent.  Cf KR Handley, Estoppel by Conduct and Election (2nd ed, 2016), [8-004]: 
‘an estoppel created by a contractual convention cannot trump the representee’s 
power, in a proper case, to rescind the contract, including the clause, for 
misrepresentation.’ 
72 [2015] EWHC 871 (Comm) at [120].  
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purpose than the one specified,73 or that it is limited in scope so as not to 
extend to the representations actually made.74  
 
Freedom of contract and public policy 
 
27. Freedom of contract lies at the heart of contractual estoppel.75 The 
parties should be allowed to order their affairs as they wish, unless it is 
runs contrary to statute or some established principle of public policy.76 
Public policy includes the deterrence of fraud, and nobody has tried to 
argue that contractual estoppel should afford an answer to a fraudster’s 
claim on a contract.77  
 
28. Contractual estoppel has been developed in the context of the 
exclusion of liability for misrepresentation. We have seen that it provides 
a legal explanation for the validity of ‘no representation’ and ‘no 
reliance’ clauses, which contradict the true state of affairs and prevent a 
claim for misrepresentation arising. The importance of contractual 
estoppel does not end there for it may be applied more generally to 
prevent parties denying the existence of a state of affairs which was the 
basis of their contract. Banking and derivatives contracts may include 
provisions that no advisory duty is to arise or has arisen in the past. 
Building and engineering contracts may give conclusive effect to 
certificates of an architect or engineer. Mortgages, loans and guarantees 
may provide that a certificate of indebtedness signed by the financier will 
                                           
73 Camerata Property Inc v Credit Suisse Securities (Europe) Ltd [2011] EWHC 479 
(Comm) at [184]. 
74 UBS AG (London Branch) v Kommunale Wasserwerke Leipzig GMBH [2014] 
EWHC 3615 (Comm) at [773-784]. 
75 Prime Sight Ltd v Lavarello [2013] UKPC 22 at [46]-[47], Lord Toulson, and main 
text to n 23 above. 
76 Globe Motors Inc v TRW Lucas Varity Electric Steering Ltd [2016] EWCA Civ 396 
at [64] and [100], Beatson LJ. 
77 Contractual estoppel will not work where the allegation is of fraudulent 
misrepresentation or deliberate concealment (the position is more uncertain with 
regard to the exclusion of liability for the fraud of an agent or employee): see 
Raiffeisen Zentralbank Osterreich AG v Royal Bank of Scotland plc [2010] EWHC 
1392 (Comm), [2011] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 123 at [325], Christopher Clarke J; HIH 
Casualty and General Insurance Ltd v Chase Manhatten Bank [2003] UKHL 6, 
[2003] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 61 at [16], Lord Bingham; cf Deutsche Bank AG v Unitech 
Global Ltd [2013] EWHC 2793 (Comm) at [156] (although dishonest 
misrepresentation was alleged it made no difference because the issue was whether 
the clause precluded a duty of care arising), affd [2016] EWCA Civ 119; Graisley 
Properties Ltd v Barclays Bank plc [2013] EWCA Civ 1372 at [29] (the point was 
‘arguable’).  
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be conclusive evidence of the amount owing. There are plenty of other 
examples.78 
 
29. Proactive Sports Management Ltd v Rooney79 provides a good 
example of the potentially wide application of contractual estoppel and 
also of some of the problems that can arise because of it. The issue was 
whether an image rights representation agreement (IRRA) between a 
company (Proactive) providing management and agency services to a 
professional footballer (Wayne Rooney) and the company (Stoneygate) to 
which his image rights had been assigned was unenforceable by the 
management company as being in restraint of trade. Proactive argued that 
Stoneygate was contractually estopped by virtue of clause 24 of the IRRA 
from contending that any restraints imposed by the agreement were 
unreasonable. Clause 24 was headed ‘Independent Legal Advice’ and 
read as follows: 
 
‘The Client and the Player hereby confirm that in reviewing this 
Agreement prior to execution and deciding to enter into this 
agreement, they have sought, taken and understood independent 
legal advice and hereby confirm that the terms and conditions 
thereof, including without limitation the Term and financial 
provisions of the Company’s appointment hereunder, are 
reasonable.’ 
 
30. HH Judge Hegarty QC, sitting as a judge of the High Court, rejected 
Proactive’s argument. The judge said:80 
 
‘I would regard it as a highly unsatisfactory consequence of the 
principle [of contractual estoppel] if it meant that a party who 
sought to take advantage of a contract by the transparent device of 
ensuring that some suitable provision akin to clause 24 was 
included in the contract. The reason why such a device would not, 
in my judgment, be effective is because restraint of trade is a 
matter of public policy out of which the parties cannot contract.’ 
 
31. Public policy can be used to control freedom of contract. Aikens LJ 
acknowledged the point in Springwell when he said:81 
                                           
78 See KR Handley, Estoppel by Conduct and Election (2 ed, 2016), [8-004]. 
79 [2010] EWHC 1807 (QB), reversed in part [2011] EWCA Civ 1444, [2012] 2 All 
ER (Comm) 815. 
80 At [670]. See also P Feltham, D Hochberg and T Leech, Spencer Bower on 
Estoppel by Representation (4th ed, 2004), at VIII.10.3, and cited in Rooney at [670]. 
81 [2010] EWCA Civ 705 at [144]. 
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‘Apart from the remarks of Diplock J in Lowe v Lombank, Mr 
Brindle did not show us any case that might support the 
proposition that parties cannot agree that X is the case even if both 
know that it is not so. I am unaware of any legal principle to that 
effect. The only possible exception might be if the particular 
agreement between A and B on the certain state of affairs 
concerned contradicts some other specific or more general rule of 
English public policy.’  
 
32. Public policy issues may explain a case like Lowe v Lombank in terms 
of consumer protection.82 The courts will not allow the parties to usurp 
the function of the court in such cases. This explains why the parties’ 
agreement that a term is ‘reasonable’ does not always decide the issue, 
although the fact they have so agreed will be something the court must 
take into account.83 In Rooney,84 the judge said that he did not ‘consider 
that the confirmation that the terms and conditions of the Agreement were 
“reasonable” can prevent the Court from determining whether Proactive 
has, in fact, discharged the burden of showing that the restraints were 
reasonable.’ Similarly, in Dinsdale Moorland Services Ltd v Evans,85 
Judge Behrens, sitting in the High Court, declined to award summary 
judgment in favour of an employer seeking to enforce a restrictive 
covenant against its managing director, despite the fact that the managing 
director had agreed under the terms of the employment contract that the 
restrictions contained in the clause ‘are reasonable and necessary for the 
protection of [the company] and that they do not bear harshly upon him’. 
The judge held that the public policy restraints relating to such covenants 
could not be avoided by contractual estoppel, and stated that ‘[i]t seems 
to me to be by no means fanciful to suggest that the parties cannot 
themselves agree that such a clause is reasonable in the public interest’.86 
But where public policy is not in issue, there seems nothing to prevent the 
                                           
82 In effect, that was how Aikens LJ explained the case in Springwell [2010] EWCA 
Civ 705 at [151], when he said that clause 9(ii) of the hire purchase agreement in 
Lowe v Lombank was an attempt to evade s 8(2), (3) of the Hire Purchase Act 1938. 
For similar public policy reasoning, applied with reference to the Consumer Credit 
Act 1974, see Wood v Capital Bridging Financing Ltd [2015] EWCA Civ 451 at [30]-
[31], Briggs LJ; NRAM plc v McAdam [2015] EWCA Civ 751 at [53]-[56], Gloster 
LJ. 
83 See also LSREF III Wight Ltd v Millvalley Ltd [2016] EWHC 466 (Comm) at 
[120]-[122], Cooke J: contractual estoppel not allowed to oust court’s jurisdiction to 
rectify contracts. 
84 At [671]. 
85 [2014] EWHC 2 (Ch), [2014] 2 Costs LR 217. 
86 At [41]. 
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parties from clearly and unambiguously agreeing that a contractual (as 
opposed to a statutory or public policy) requirement of ‘reasonableness’, 
‘reasonable endeavours’ or ‘good faith’ has been met.87 Contractual 
estoppel would then work to prevent either party from later denying that 
such a state of affairs existed.88 
 
33. It has been argued by Paul Marshall that contractual estoppel should 
not be used to frustrate the public policy of protection of investors 
represented by the Financial Conduct Authority’s Conduct of Business 
Sourcebook.89 He is particularly critical of the judge in Crestsign v 
National Westminster Bank plc90 who, after holding that the bank had 
voluntarily assumed an advisory role in recommending an interest rate 
swap to Crestsign Ltd, and that the bank was in breach of the obligations 
it had chosen to assume; nevertheless, held that the expressly agreed basis 
of the contractual relationship was that the bank was not acting in any 
advisory capacity. Marshall submits that the judge failed to recognize that 
‘the regulatory backdrop is, additionally, relevant to the question as to 
whether, where a duty has been voluntarily assumed (namely to advise), 
such a duty and consequent liability for breach, can be excluded, whether 
fairly or at all’.91  
 
34. But public policy arguments must not be given free rein. This is 
particularly the case where the public policy is derived from provisions 
in, or made pursuant to, an Act of Parliament, such as the Financial 
Services and Markets Act 2000. The Act of Parliament defines the extent 
of the court’s power to intervene and where there is no statutory 
provision giving protection to a particular group, as is the case for 
corporate buyers of financial services who have contracted on an agreed 
state of facts and who fall outside the ‘private person’ statutory right of 
action under the 2000 Act, the courts should not look to introduce 
protection by the ‘back door’ through general reliance on ‘the regulatory 
backdrop’.92 The fact that s 138D of the FSMA 2000 is not available to 
                                           
87 See Shaker v Vistajet Group Holding SA [2012] EWHC 1329 (Comm), [2012] 2 All 
ER (Comm) 1010, Teare J. 
88 At [25]. 
89 Marshall [2014] JIBFL 679, 683-684, especially with reference to COBS 2.1.2 
(which applies to any client) and COBS 2.1.3 (which applies to retail clients). The 
COBS rules are made pursuant to the requirements of the Markets in Financial 
Instruments Directive 2004/39/EC (MiFID) and the FCA’s operational objectives 
under the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000.  
90 [2014] EWHC 3043 (Ch). 
91 Marshall [2014] JIBFL 679, 684. 
92 In Green & Rowley v Royal Bank of Scotland plc [2013] EWCA Civ 1197, [2013] 2 
CLC 632, the Court of Appeal held that the existence of a statutory means of 
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all, but only to a ‘private person’, is recognition that the statutory 
protection is intended to be limited. If the problem stems from the fact 
that the definition of a ‘private person’ has been interpreted too narrowly 
in Titan Steel Wheels93 then the answer lies in reversal of that decision. 
 
35. Importantly, in Prime Sight Ltd v Lavarello,94 Lord Toulson said that: 
 
‘… contractual estoppels are subject to the same limits as other 
contractual provisions, but there is nothing inherently contrary to 
public policy in parties agreeing to contract on the basis that 
certain facts are to be treated as established for the purposes of 
their transaction, although they know the acts to be otherwise.’ 
 
This supports the argument that there is no public policy doctrine, such as 
illegality, the rule against penalty clauses or restraint of trade, that 
directly impeaches a ‘no representation’ or ‘no reliance’ clause. Does the 
very fact that the clause purports to negate pre-contractual statements 
amounting to representations inducing the contract, or negates reliance 
upon those statements, of itself raise issues of public policy? Professor 
John Carter thinks that it does.95 His reasoning is as follows: the 
Misrepresentation Act 1967 embodies rules of public policy; a ‘no 
reliance’ clause is an attempt to contract out of the Act; there is nothing 
in the Act which permits that to occur; if the parties choose to do that 
their clause is simply void and no question of reasonableness arises; the 
clause is invalid independently of the Act. However, there is no authority 
to support Carter’s argument.96 This is not surprising. It is submitted that 
there must be evidence of a policy under the Act to regulate such clauses, 
                                                                                                                        
enforcement of the then current conduct of business rules under s 150 (now s 138D) 
of the FSMA 2000, meant that no separate co-extensive common law duty of care 
arose and there could be no claim for breach of those rules other than under s 150. By 
contrast, where a bank undertakes an advisory duty, what is to be expected of the 
reasonably skilled and careful advisor under the common law is in part informed by 
the regulatory backdrop (Rowley & Green at [18], Tomlinson LJ). Rowley & Green 
was distinguished in Crestsign [2014] EWHC 3043 (Ch) at [147] where the bank 
undertook to explain the nature of the transaction to the customer and was held to owe 
an ‘intermediate’ duty to do so fully and properly (as well as accurately) - but note the 
doubts later expressed about such an intermediate duty in Thornbridge Ltd v Barclays 
Bank plc [2015] EWHC 3430 (QB) at [118]-[131]. 
93 [2010] EWHC 211 (Comm). See also para 1 above. 
94 [2013] UKPC 436 at [47]. 
95 JW Carter, The Construction of Commercial Contracts (2013), [10-33]; E Peden 
and JW Carter, ‘Entire Agreement – and Similar – Clauses’ (2006) 22 JCL 1, 12. 
96 As Carter himself acknowledges, see Construction of Commercial Contracts, [10-
33]. 
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and this takes us to the second question to be discussed in this paper, 
namely whether s 3 of the Misrepresentation Act 1967 extends to ‘no 
representation’ and ‘no reliance’ clauses. Parliament has defined the 
types of term that are to be controlled. This represents the limit of that 
control. The principle of freedom of contract would be undermined if the 
courts attempted to go further.97  
 
Misrepresentation Act 1967, s 3 
 
36. Section 3(1) of the Misrepresentation Act 1967 provides as follows: 
 
If a contract contains a term which would exclude or restrict –  
(a) any liability to which a party to a contract may be subject by reason of any 
misrepresentation made by him before the contract was made; or 
(b) any remedy available to another party to the contract by reason of such a 
misrepresentation, 
that term shall be of no effect except in so far as it satisfies the requirement of 
reasonableness as stated in s 11(1) of the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977; and it is 
for those claiming that the term satisfies that requirement to show that it does. 
 
37. Section 3 of the Misrepresentation Act has recently been amended by 
the Consumer Rights Act 2015, so while statutory control of a clause 
exempting liability for misrepresentation in a contract that is not a 
‘consumer contract’, as defined in the 2015 Act,98 is still to be found in s 
3 of the Misrepresentation Act, statutory control of such a clause in a 
‘consumer contract’ now falls within the general control of unfair terms 
to be found in Part 2 of the Consumer Rights Act 2015.99 The focus of 
this paper is on the corporate buyer and the 1967 Act, because all the 
claims, whether brought by an individual or a company, that have reached 
the courts so far, and which have involved consideration of the statutory 
control of exemption clauses, pre-date the 2015 Act. 
 
38. There has been uncertainty as to whether s 3 of the Misrepresentation 
Act applies to a clause that is so worded so as to exclude any liability for 
misrepresentation from arising at all, by stating that one of the essential 
elements of that liability is missing, for example, through a ‘no 
representation’ or ‘no reliance’ clause. A similar problem arises, although 
in a slightly different way, with s 2 of the Unfair Contract Terms 1977, 
which controls terms in non-consumer contracts that exclude or restrict 
liability for negligence, and which will be particularly relevant to a claim 
for negligent misrepresentation where the misrepresentor is not the other 
                                           
97 See National Westminster Bank plc v Morgan [1985] AC 686, 708, Lord Scarman. 
98 Consumer Rights Act 2015, s 61(1)-(3). 
99 Misrepresentation Act 1967, s 3(2). 
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party to the contract.100 Section 13(1) of the 1977 Act extends the reach 
of s 2 to any term which ‘excludes or restricts the relevant obligation or 
duty’. The Misrepresentation Act 1967 does not include a similar 
provision. But s 13(1) does not answer all questions because it still leaves 
the court to decide whether a term excludes or restricts a duty or merely 
defines the scope (or ‘basis’) of the parties’ relationship in the first 
place.101  
 
39. The case law has not been consistent. It has been said that there is a 
‘tension’ in the authorities that needs to be resolved.102 On the one hand, 
there are cases like Watford Electronics Ltd v Sanderson CFL Ltd,103 
where the Court of Appeal held that a ‘no reliance’ clause prevented 
liability from arising (and did not exclude it) so as to escape statutory 
control. Chadwick LJ thought that where both parties to the contract had 
acknowledged, in the document itself, that they had not relied upon any 
pre-contract representation, ‘it would be bizarre (unless compelled to do 
so by the words which they have used) to attribute to them an intention to 
exclude liability which they must have thought could never arise’.104  
 
40. By contrast, there are cases like Cremdean Properties Ltd v Nash,105 
where Scarman LJ rejected the argument that a clause warning the 
representee to check the accuracy of a statement was a clause which 
effectively avoided s 3 by preventing their being a ‘misrepresentation’. 
He famously said: 
 
                                           
100 As, eg, in a Hedley Byrne & Co Ltd v Heller & Partners Ltd [1964] AC 465 type 
scenario. 
101 This reminds us of Professor Brian Coote’s thesis that exclusion clauses define 
liability by determining the obligations assumed under the contract in the first place: 
B Coote, Exception Clauses (1964), especially Chap 1 (reprinted as B Coote, ‘The 
Function of Exception Clauses’ in R Bigwood (ed), Contract as Assumption: Essays 
on a Theme (2010)). Cf JA Weir’s review of Coote’s book [1965] CLJ 801; J Adams 
and R Brownsword, ‘The Unfair Contract Terms Act: A Decade of Discretion’ (1988) 
104 LQR 94. The impact of s 13(1) of the 1977 Act on definitional clauses is explored 
in N Palmer and D Yates, ‘The Future of the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977’ [1981] 
CLJ 108. 
102 Ahmed v Landstone Leisure Ltd [2009] EWHC 125 (Ch) at [30]-[31], HH Judge 
Purle QC, sitting as a High Court judge. 
103 [2001] EWCA Civ 317, [2001] 1 All ER (Comm) 696. See also William Sindall 
plc v Cambridgeshire CC [1994] 1 WLR 1016, 1034, Hoffmann LJ. 
104 At [41]. Two factors might explain this robust view: (1) both parties were 
commercial parties, and (2) the estoppel would be evidential, which means there 
would have to be reliance on the clause (Peekay was still five years away) 
105 (1977) 244 EG 547, 551. See also Government of Zanzibar v British Aerospace 
(Lancaster House) Ltd [2000] 1 WLR 2333. 
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‘Humpty Dumpty would have fallen for this argument. If we were 
to fall for it, the Misrepresentation Act would be dashed to pieces 
which not all the King’s lawyers could put together again.’  
 
Bridge LJ said that the ‘ingenuity of a draftsman’ should not be allowed 
to defeat the plain purpose at which s 3 was aimed: otherwise s 3 could 
always be defeated by including an appropriate ‘no reliance’ clause in the 
contract, however unreasonable that might be.106  
 
41. More recent cases have adopted the same ‘substance over form’ 
approach favoured in Cremdean v Nash. For example, in AXA Sun Life 
Services plc v Campbell Martin Ltd,107 it was submitted by Leading 
Counsel for AXA that, since the parties had agreed by clause 24 of their 
contract that there had been no misrepresentations, s 3 of the 1967 Act 
could not apply to that clause. Stanley Burton LJ (obiter) said:108 
 
‘While I see the logic of his submission, to my mind his approach 
to s 3 is too formalistic. Looked at sensibly and practically … it 
excludes AXA’s liability for misrepresentations it made, and 
would be subject to the statutory requirement of reasonableness in 
this respect too.’  
 
42. The obvious attraction of this approach is that it enables the courts to 
apply the statutory test of reasonableness to any clause which ‘in 
substance’ excludes or restricts liability. Professor Edwin Peel prefers the 
‘substance’ approach because it still allows matters of commercial 
certainty and allocation of risk, which ‘no representation’, ‘no reliance’ 
and other ‘basis’ clauses are designed to achieve, to be taken into account 
as part of the test of reasonableness and, where the parties are of roughly 
equal bargaining power, he believes these factors are likely to lead to a 
decision that the clause is reasonable.109 If the courts do not take such an 
approach, judicial recognition of the doctrine of contractual estoppel 
makes it much harder for a contracting party to rely on the other party’s 
pre-contractual misrepresentation as a ground for rescission of the 
contract. The rescinding party is at much greater risk of being held to 
have wrongly exercised the right and, in consequence, of finding himself 
in repudiatory breach of contract.110  
                                           
106 At 551. 
107 [2011] EWCA Civ 133, [2011] 1 CLC 312. 
108 At [51].  
109 E Peel, ‘Reasonable Exemption Clauses’ (2001) 117 LQR 545, 549. 
110 PS Davies and C Hare, ‘Limits of rescission for misrepresentation’ [2016] JIBFL 
387, 389. 
 25 
 
43. But it may be easier to say that the issue turns on ‘substance over 
form’ than it is to apply that principle in practice. Andrew Smith J made 
the following astute observation in Camerata Property Inc v Credit 
Suisse Securities (Europe) Ltd:111 
 
‘Although the distinction is clear in principle, it seems to me 
that in application the question whether, as a matter of 
substance rather than form, a particular provision should be 
regarded as defining the terms upon which business was 
conducted or as purporting to allow a party by his standard 
terms to render a performance substantially different from that 
which was reasonably to be expected of him can be a fine one, 
and ultimately, I think, can be a matter of impression rather 
than analysis.’  
How is the ‘substance’ of the provision to be identified?  
 
44. In Raiffeisen Zentralbank Osterreich AG v Royal Bank of Scotland 
plc,112 Christopher Clarke J said that the ‘key question’ in deciding 
whether a ‘no representation’ or ‘no reliance’ clause is an exemption 
clause, so as to fall within the scope of s 3 of the 1967 Act, is ‘whether 
the clause attempts to rewrite history or parts company with reality’. He 
immediately followed this statement with an example, which appears as 
footnote 45 to his judgment: ‘As in Lowe v Lombank when the agreement 
was as to “past facts, known by both parties to be untrue”’. 
 
45. In Raiffeisen, the claimant bank alleged that it had been induced to 
enter into a syndicated loan facility by several representations made by 
the defendant bank which had arranged the facility. The syndicate 
member argued that certain representations had been impliedly made in 
an information memorandum distributed by the arranger. Christopher 
Clarke J held that a ‘no representation’ and a ‘no responsibility’ clause 
contained in the information memorandum formed part of the context to 
be taken into account when considering whether the alleged 
representations had been made, and concluded that the parties contracted 
on the basis that information provided by the arranger was not to be 
regarded as a representation of fact on which the arranger intended that 
the syndicate member should rely or upon which it was entitled to rely. It 
followed that the ‘no representation’ and ‘no responsibility’ clauses were 
                                           
111 [2011] EWHC 479 (Comm) at [186]. 
112 [2010] EWHC 1392 (Comm), [2011] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 123 at [314]. 
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not in substance an attempt to exclude or restrict liability so as to fall 
within the protective legislation.113 
 
46. Judges and textbook writers frequently refer to Christopher Clarke J’s 
‘key question’, but it is surprising how often they fail to mention footnote 
45!114 Yet, it is an important footnote because, by providing this example, 
it is submitted that Christopher Clarke J implicitly accepts that there must 
be a balance between the ‘real’ world of actual occurrence and the 
‘virtual’ world of contractual agreement, such that a known untruth may 
only be used by the contracting parties as the agreed basis of their 
relationship when it is reasonable to do so.115  
 
47. Immediately after setting out what he described as ‘the key question’, 
Clarke J went on to distinguish cases where:116 
 
‘[i]f sophisticated commercial parties agree, in terms of which they 
are both aware, to regulate their future relationship by prescribing 
the basis on which they will be dealing with each other and what 
representations that are or are not making, a suitably drafted clause 
may properly be regarded as establishing that no representations 
(or none other than honest belief) are being made or are intended to 
be relied on…’ 
 
                                           
113 See also IFE Fund SA v Goldman Sachs International [2007] 1 Lloyds Rep 264 at 
[70]-[71], Toulson J , affd [2007] EWCA Civ 811, [2007] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 449 at [28], 
Waller LJ. 
114 Examples of the former include Avrora Fine Arts Investment Ltd v Christie 
Manson & Woods Ltd [2012] EWHC 2198 (Ch), [2012] PNLR 35 at [142]; Crestsign 
Ltd v National Westminster Bank plc [2014] EWHC 3043 (Ch) at [101]. Examples of 
the latter include A Burrows, A Restatement of the English Law of Contract (2016), p 
100; E Peel, Treitel’s Law of Contract (14th ed, 2015), [9-126]; R Lawson, Exclusion 
Clauses and Unfair Contract Terms (11th ed, 2014), [7-006]. 
115 The fact that both parties know that the clause does not reflect what actually 
happened of itself does not make the agreement a ‘sham’. For acts or documents to be 
a sham, ‘all the parties thereto must have a common intention that the acts or 
documents are not to create the legal rights and obligations which they give the 
appearance of creating’: Snook v London and West Riding Investments Ltd [1967] 2 
QB 786, 802, Diplock LJ. The seller may know that the statement of ‘no 
representation’ or ‘no reliance’ is false, but this does not mean that the buyer does not 
intend the statement to be acted upon or has acted in such a way as to create the 
impression of that intention. For example, there was nothing to suggest in Lowe v 
Lombark that the buyer of the car herself had a common intention with the sellers that 
the acknowledgment she gave would be no more than appearance (Trukhtanov (2009) 
125 LQR 648, 658, n 49).  
116 At [314]. 
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from those where:117 
 
‘to tell the man in the street that the car you are selling him is 
perfect and then agree that the basis of your contract is that no 
representations have been made or relied on, may be nothing more 
than an attempt retrospectively to alter the character and effect of 
what has gone before, and in substance an attempt to exclude or 
restrict liability.’  
 
48. What is striking it that the passage dealing with ‘sophisticated 
commercial parties’ points to terms which ‘regulate their future 
relationship by prescribing the basis on which they will be dealing with 
each other’  (emphasis added), whereas the passage dealing with the ‘man 
in the street’ changes the chronological order, so that the agreement that 
no representations are being made comes after the statement that the car 
is perfect and is an attempt retrospectively to alter the character and effect 
of what has gone before. Christopher Clarke J must have had Diplock J’s 
statement in Lowe v Lombank in mind.118 In the ‘man in the street’ 
scenario, Christopher Clarke J regarded the agreed basis of the contract as 
being, in substance, no more than an attempt to alter ‘past facts, known 
by both parties to be untrue’. This was the very thing that had to be made 
subject to the reasonableness test.  
 
49. But why restrict the example to the ‘man in the street’? An agreement 
between ‘sophisticated commercial parties’ may similarly seek to alter 
‘past facts, known by both parties to be untrue’. Christopher Clarke J was 
prepared to allow freedom of contract to hold sway where sophisticated 
commercial parties agreed how they should regulate their future 
relationship, but he said nothing about being so indulgent when they 
attempt retrospectively to alter their past relationship. It is submitted that, 
in a ‘past facts’ scenario like this, we should not take commercial parties 
out of the protection of s 3 of the 1967 Act on the spurious ground that 
only consumers require protection.119 The Consumer Rights Act 2015 has 
now taken ‘consumer contracts’ out of Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977, 
and given consumers broader protection under Part 2 of 2015 Act.120 
                                           
117 At [315]. 
118 See para 17 above. Whilst Diplock J thought that a statement as to ‘past facts, 
known by both parties to be untrue’, could not be converted into a contractual 
obligation, he accepted that there could be a promise ‘that facts exist at the time of the 
promise or will exist in the future’.  
119 Contra, Trukhtanov (2009) 125 LQR 648, 669. 
120 Parts 1 and 2 of the Act were brought into force so as to apply to contracts made 
on or after October 1, 2015.  
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However, as neither large, medium nor small companies can be 
‘consumers’ for this purpose,121 they fall outside the 2015 Act, and such 
statutory protection as they have can only be found in the Unfair Contract 
Terms Act, as extended to misrepresentations by s 3 of the 
Misrepresentation Act. As a matter of general policy, it seems clear that 
Christopher Clarke J was keen to ensure that s 3 applied to contractual 
estoppel cases, which do not require detrimental reliance, where there are 
‘no further control mechanism on its operation.122 
 
50. This uniform treatment of ‘past facts’ cases gains support from the 
Court of Appeal’s decision in Springwell. In that case the purchaser of a 
complex financial product was an investment company owned and run by 
a family of wealthy Greek shipowners. These were not ‘men in the 
street’.  Nevertheless, Aikens LJ applied the ‘men in the street’ part of 
Christopher Clarke J’s analysis and held that a clause which provided that 
‘no representation or warranty, express or implied, is or will be made … 
in or in relation to such documents or information’ was ‘an attempt 
retrospectively to alter the character and effect of what has gone before’ 
and thus it fell within s 3 of the Misrepresentation Act 1967 so as to be 
exposed to the test of reasonableness. 
 
51. However, not all clauses that deal with past facts in this way will 
necessarily be held to be exclusion or limitation clauses. It may not be 
certain what, if any, representation has been made or whether there has 
been reliance. In cases of uncertainty, a term stating that no 
representation has been made or relied upon does not alter ‘past facts, 
known by both parties to be untrue’ (emphasis added). Christopher Clarke 
J was perfectly entitled to take account of the ‘no representation’ clause 
as one factor to consider when deciding whether a representation was to 
be implied. In those circumstances, the clause merely set out the basis of 
the relationship of the parties in such a case of uncertainty.123 It should be 
remembered that ‘no representation’, ‘no reliance’ and similar basis 
clauses have greatest commercial utility when there is uncertainty.124 
                                           
121 Consumer Rights Act 2015, s 2(3), defines ‘consumer’ to mean ‘an individual 
acting for purposes that are wholly or mainly outside that individual’s trade, business, 
craft or profession.’ 
122 At [307].  
123 See also Crestsign Ltd v National Westminster Bank plc [2014] EWHC 3042 (Ch) 
at [115]-[116], where Tim Kerr QC, sitting as a Deputy Judge of the High Court, held 
that, on the facts before him, reasonable people might disagree whether advice was 
given, and so the parties could legitimately seek to define their relationship on the 
basis that no advice was given. 
124 See para 7 above. 
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52. It would be wrong to think, as some have, that Christopher Clarke J 
merely applied a ‘but for’ test when distinguishing between definitional 
(or basis) and exclusion clauses.125 First, he never said that he was doing 
that and, secondly, such a test would ensnare his ‘sophisticated 
commercial parties’ scenario, which he clearly intended to keep out of the 
protective net. A ‘but for’ test means the court must first ignore the clause 
and, in its absence, decide whether a cause of action can be made out. 
Where it can, then a clause preventing that cause of action from arising is 
to be treated as an exclusion clause and exposed to the reasonableness 
test. A ‘but for’ test was famously employed by the House of Lords in 
Smith v Eric S Bush126 when determining whether a disclaimer was 
caught by s 13(1) of the Unfair Contract Terms Act.127 However, a ‘but 
for’ test is a crude instrument to distinguish between definitional and 
exclusion clauses, and arguably underplays the significance of the 
contractual relationship between the parties.128 The test fails to take 
sufficient account of the parties’ freedom to contract on terms of their 
choosing. It brings their chosen terms into account too late in the day. 
The same can also be said of any test based upon whether the clause 
conflicts with the ‘reasonable expectations’ of the parties.129 The presence 
of a ‘no representation’, ‘no reliance’ or similar basis clause should be 
taken to influence those reasonable expectations.130 Any attempt to 
                                           
125 J White, ‘Defining “Exclusion” Clauses and Excluding “Defining” Clauses: The 
Need to Clarify the Scope of the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977’ [2016] JBL 373, 
382, who goes on to argue that ‘this approach ought not to be pursued due to its 
inability to account for freedom of contract for defining clauses’. 
126 [1990] 1 AC 831, 857, Lord Griffith, who took account of the second report of the 
Law Commission on Exemption Clauses (1975) (Law Com No 69), especially para 
127. See also Phillips Products Ltd v Hyland [1987] 2 All ER 620, 625, Slade LJ. 
127 See also Deutsche Bank AG v Chang Tse Wen [2013] SGCA 49 at [63], Menon CJ 
examining the wording of s 13(1) of the Singaporean Unfair Contract Terms Act, and 
concluding (obiter) that ‘[t]his seems to preclude any material distinction being drawn 
between clauses which exclude liability and those which restrict the scope of the duty 
or the obligation.’ The Act is almost identical to the English UCTA. 
128 In any event, in Titan Steel Wheels Ltd v Royal Bank of Scotland plc [2010] 
EWHC 211 (Comm) at [104], David Steel J said Smith v Bush ‘may have been 
somewhat overtaken by later decisions in regard to assumption of responsibility and 
the move away form any ‘but for’ test in regard to the existence and extent of any 
duty.’ 
129 Cf E Macdonald, ‘Exception Clauses: Exclusionary or Definitional? It depends!’ 
(2012) 29 JCL 47, although Macdonald accepts that where the parties are ‘legally 
sophisticated, and advised, and the transaction is a significant one’ then they may be 
taken to expect what the written terms provide. 
130 When A contracts on B’s written standard terms of business, UCTA 1977, s 
3(2)(b)(i), states that B cannot rely on a term ‘to render a contractual performance 
 30 
ignore the clause because it is a boilerplate provision and, therefore, 
likely to be unread, undermines the recognized commercial benefit of 
certainty that comes with a rigorous application of the signature rule 
enshrined in L’Estrange v Graucob.131 By signing the contract a party 
takes a risk as to the content of its terms if he does not read those terms. 
 
53. It is submitted that the legal effect of a contract term, including 
whether a term is definitional or exclusionary, turns on the common 
intention of the parties as revealed in the words used by the parties, 
construed by reference to ‘what a reasonable person having all the 
background knowledge which would have been available to the parties 
would have understood them to be using the language in the contract to 
mean’, and disregarding subjective evidence of any party’s intention.132 
Christopher Clarke J recognized this in Raiffeisen when he asks whether 
the clause ‘attempts to rewrite history or parts company with reality’. In 
using the word ‘attempts’ it is submitted that he implicitly indicates that 
the issue turns on the intention of the parties as objectively ascertained. 
The judge’s repeated reference to contextual matters, such as the 
characteristics of the parties,133 and their awareness of the relevant 
terms,134 also reveals an intention-based approach to the issue. 
 
                                                                                                                        
substantially different from that which was reasonably expected of him’, unless the 
term satisfies the requirement of reasonableness. One view is that this provision, like s 
13(1) of the 1977 Act, is designed to catch ‘disguised exemption clauses’, and it has 
been suggested that s 3(2)(b)(i) might be applied to ‘conclusive evidence clauses’ in 
commercial loan agreements (S Booysen, ‘“Pay Now-Argue Later”: Conclusive 
Evidence Clauses in Commercial Loan Contracts’ [2014] JBL 31, 42). However, ‘the 
apparently wide words of s 3(2)(b) have not given rise to an expansive interpretation 
by the courts’ (A Burrows, A Restatement of the English Law of Contract, 2016, p 
99). One difficulty is that s 3(2)(b)(i) will only come into play where one party can 
show that the clause regulates the other party’s ‘performance’, and that may be 
difficulty to establish (AXA Sun Life Service plc v Campbell Martin Ltd [2011] 
EWCA Civ 133, [2011] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 1 at [50], Stanley Burnton LJ). Furthermore, 
there is no equivalent provision to s 3(2)(b)(i) in the Misrepresentation Act 1967. 
131 Considered in para 20 above. 
132 Arnold v Britton [2015] UKSC 36, [2015] AC 1619 at [15], Lord Neuberger, 
quoting Lord Hoffmann in Chartbrook Ltd v Persimmon Homes Ltd [2009] UKHL 
38, [2009] 1 AC 1101 at [14]. See also Monde Petroleum SA v Westernzagros Ltd 
[2016] EWHC 1472 (Comm) at [237], Richard Salter QC, sitting as a Deputy High 
Court judge. 
133 See, eg, at [313] (‘commercial parties of equal bargaining power’), [314] 
(‘sophisticated commercial parties’; ‘such parties’), [315] (‘the man in the street’) and 
[317] (‘[i]f parties such as these’). 
134 See, eg, at [308] (‘eyes wide open’), [314] (‘both are aware’). 
 31 
54. Arguably, such an intention-based approach to the question is 
supported by the judgment of Tim Kerr QC, sitting as a Deputy High 
Court judge in Crestsign Ltd v National Westminster Bank plc,135 another 
case involving the sale of an interest rate swap on the bank’s standard 
terms, which included various disclaimers, but this time the buyer was a 
small, family run company and not a large commercial party. The judge 
made no express reference to an intention-based test but, after referring to 
several authorities, including Raiffeisen, he said:136  
 
‘the principle is simple enough: you look at the words used to see 
whether, understood in their proper context from the perspective of 
an impartial and reasonable observer (ie the court), they prevent a 
representation from having been made, or whether, by contrast, 
they exclude liability for making it.’ 
 
55. Crestsign was followed by Thornbridge Ltd v Barclays Bank plc, 
another case involving the sale of an interest rate swap to a small, family 
run company, where Her Honour Judge Moulder QC, sitting in the High 
Court, said that:137  
 
‘the test is not whether the clause attempts to rewrite history or 
parts company with reality. The first step is to determine as a 
matter of construction whether the terms define the basis upon 
which the parties were transacting business or whether they were 
clauses inserted as a means of evading liability.’  
 
56. The judge then reviewed Barclays Bank plc v Svizera Holdings BV,138 
where Flaux J examined Moore-Bick LJ’s judgment in Peekay,139 and 
Hamblin J’s later judgment in Cassa di Risparmio della Repubblica di 
                                           
135 [2014] EWHC 3042 (Ch). See also White [2016] JBL 373, 383: ‘[a]lthough 
Crestsign does not explicitly provide an intention-based test, its analysis clearly 
engages a similar objective intention test rather than referencing hypothetical duties 
that exist but for the clause’. 
136 At [112]. The judge held that the ‘no advice’ clause prevented a duty of care 
arising in tort, rather than excluding liability, so that it fell outside s 2(2) of the Unfair 
Contract Terms Act 1977 (see also para 33 above).   
137 [2015] EWHC 3430 (QB) at [105], and cited with approval by HH Judge Hodge, 
sitting in the High Court in Sears v Minco plc [2016] EWHC 433 (Ch) at [80]. In 
Thornbridge, HH Judge Moulder QC stated (obiter) that the ‘no reliance’ clause was 
a ‘basis’ clause, and did not exclude liability for negligence, so that it fell outside s 
2(2) of the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977. An appeal in Thornbridge is due to be 
heard on 30th November 2016. 
138 [2014] EWHC 1020 (Comm) at [58]-[59]. 
139 [2006] EWCA Civ 386 at [57]. 
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San Marino v Barclays Bank Ltd.140 The point that HH Judge Moulder 
QC drew from these cases was that the parties may agree the basis on 
which they enter into a relationship so as to give rise to a contractual 
estoppel, and that ‘[t]his is so even where for example parties agree that 
one party has not made any pre-contract representations about a particular 
matter and both parties know such representations have in fact been 
made’.141 This led her to ‘reject the submission that the test is whether the 
clause “rewrite history”’.142 
 
57. It is submitted that there is a degree of confusion here. Judge Moulder 
elides two separate issues into one. The first issue relates to the scope of 
contractual estoppel. She is right to say that the doctrine can apply to 
contractual statements about past facts that both parties know to be 
untrue.143 The second issue is whether that contractual statement is 
definitional or exclusionary for the purposes of deciding whether it falls 
within s 3 of the Misrepresentation Act. The fact that a clause that 
‘rewrites history’ precludes denial of what actually happened under the 
doctrine of contractual estoppel does not mean that the clause is 
automatically a definitional or basis clause which falls outside the statute. 
In fact, the opposite is true for, as Christopher Clarke J has told us, if it 
‘rewrites history’ then it will fall within s 3 of the 1967 Act. In summary, 
and contrary to the reasoning of Judge Moulder, a clause may be binding 
at common law, under the doctrine of contractual estoppel, and yet still 
be categorized as exclusionary, so as to be unenforceable under the 
statute if it fails the test of reasonableness. 
 
58. An intention-based approach to the question whether a term is 
definitional or exclusionary may be simple enough to state, but it may be 
difficult to apply in practice without further guidance. Christopher Clarke 
J provides that guidance in Raiffeisen. It is submitted that the approach 
taken by Christopher Clarke J, and that taken by the judges in Crestsign 
and Thornbridge (at least after the confusion in Judge Moulder’s 
reasoning is identified), are not mutually exclusive. Objective 
construction of the clause in question is essential in order to ascertain the 
common intention of the parties. In essence, the court must ask whether 
the parties intend to exclude or restrict liability or merely to define the 
basis of their relationship. The process is analogous to where the court 
                                           
140 [2011] EWHC 484 (Comm) at [505] and [525]. 
141 [2015] EWHC 3430 (QB) at [111]. 
142 Ibid. 
143 Springwell [2010] EWCA Civ 1221 at [155], Aikens LJ; Cassa di Risparmio della 
Repubblica di San Marino v Barclays Bank Ltd [2011] EWHC 484 (Comm) at [505], 
Hamblin J. 
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must ascertain whether the parties intend a term to be a condition of the 
contract. Outside statute, the classification of a term turns on the intention 
of the parties, which must be objectively construed.144 The labels used by 
the parties are not decisive of the issue when classifying terms,145 and 
neither should they be decisive when deciding whether the parties’ 
intention is to define or exclude. A contractual provision that the parties 
‘intend clause X to define the nature and extent of the obligations existing 
between them and do not intend clause X to exclude liability’ would not 
in itself determine the issue.146 
 
Conclusion 
 
59. There remains something unsettling about a world that parts company 
with reality and where business is done on the basis of knowingly 
untruthful statements contained in the contract itself. Here we have a 
direct conflict between, on the one hand, the principles of freedom of 
contract and commercial certainty, which are at the heart of contractual 
estoppel, and, on the other, the need to protect the weak(er) and (more) 
vulnerable from exploitation. Freedom of contract and commercial 
certainty currently have the upper hand.147 There is nothing wrong either 
with that or with the doctrine of contractual estoppel itself. The 
commercial utility of the doctrine justifies its application, and that utility 
will be all the greater when dealing with the sale of complex financial 
products between sophisticated commercial parties of roughly equal 
bargaining strength using industry standard terms of business.148 
Nevertheless, it is submitted that an appropriate balance can be achieved 
between the ‘real’ world and the ‘virtual’ world created by the agreement 
of the parties, not by denying effect to that agreement, unless it impinges 
upon statute or some broader principle of public policy, but by 
                                           
144 Bentsen v Taylor Sons & Co [1893] 2 QB 274, 281; Bunge Corporation v Tradax 
Export SA [1981] 1 WLR 711, 725. See generally, A Burrows, A Restatement of the 
English Law of Contract (2016), p 114, cited with approval by Gross LJ in Grand 
China Logistics Holding (Group) Ltd v Spar Shipping SA [2016] EWCA Civ 982 at 
[20], and see also Sir Terence Etherton MR at [98]. 
145 L Schuler AG v Wickman Machine Tool Sales Ltd [1974] AC 235, HL. 
146 Cf White [2016] JBL 373, 384. 
147 This seems to be a current trend for contract law in general: there is strong 
evidence of the influence of freedom of contract in recent decisions of the Supreme 
Court, especially in the speeches of Lord Neuberger in Arnold v Britton [2015] UKSC 
36, [2015] AC 1619 (construction), Cavendish Square Holdings BV v El Makdessi 
[2015] UKSC 67, [2015] 3 WLR 1373 (penalty clauses) and Marks & Spencer plc v 
BNP Paribas Securities Services Trust Co (Jersey) Ltd [2015] UKSC 72, [2016] AC 
742 (implied terms). 
148 Braithwaite (2016) 132 LQR 120, 133. 
 34 
recognizing that Parliament’s control of clauses which exclude or restrict 
liability, through the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 and the 
Misrepresentation Act 1967, also extends to those clauses that seek to 
deny ‘past facts, known by both parties to be untrue’. Movement in one 
direction (towards contractual estoppel) demands equal movement in 
another direction (towards pragmatic interpretation of the legislation). 
 
60. However, Lord Toulson has recently reminded us that ‘words of 
exception may be simply a way of delineating the scope of the primary 
obligation’.149 Similarly, ‘no representation’, ‘no reliance’ and other 
‘basis clauses’ may simply delineate the scope of a primary obligation. 
Where they do so, they should not be exposed to a test of 
reasonableness.150 Whether they do so, is a different question. It is not 
surprising that, with the rise of contractual estoppel, the courts have 
focused more on the test to be applied to distinguish between ‘basis 
clauses’ and those which exclude or restrict liability. That there has been 
inconsistency in the case law is not surprising either because the poorly 
drafted Misrepresentation Act fails to address the issue at all. Just as 
much as we must construe the words used by the parties, it is also 
necessary to construe the words used by Parliament in the Act itself and, 
unfortunately, the Act only gives us ‘exclude or restrict’ to work on.151  
 
61. The ‘key question’ asked by Christopher Clarke J helps identify the 
parties’ intentions. Where it is answered positively, the clause will be 
held to ‘exclude or restrict’ liability. Where it is answered negatively, the 
clause may (not must) be held to define obligations and provide the basis 
(or part of the basis) of the relationship between the contracting parties. 
But construction of a term turns on ‘the meaning of the relevant words … 
in their documentary, factual and commercial context’.152 The 
characteristics of the contracting parties are part of the commercial 
context. Whether the contracting parties are or are not both sophisticated 
commercial parties of roughly equal bargaining power is a contextual 
                                           
149 Impact Funding Solutions Ltd v AIG Europe Ltd [2016] UKSC 57 at [35]. 
150 Cf N Goh, ‘Non-Reliance Clauses and Contractual Estoppel: Commercially 
Sensible or Anomalous?’ [2015] JBL 511, 526, who makes the somewhat draconian 
proposal that all ‘no reliance’ clauses be brought within the UCTA regime.  
151 J Cartwright, Misrepresentation, Mistake and Non-Disclosure (3rd ed, 2012), [9-
21, n 81], notes that, during the passing of the Misrepresentation Bill, the Solicitor-
General did not give a direct answer to a question about how ‘no reliance’ clauses 
would be caught by s 3 (Hansard, HC Vol 741, 20 Feb 1967, cols 1375-1376, 1387-
1390). 
152 Arnold v Britton [2015] AC 1619 at [15], Lord Neuberger. 
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factor to be taken into account when construing the contract in order, 
objectively, to ascertain the intention of the parties.153  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                           
153 White [2016] JBL 373, 385 rejects an intention-based test as ‘counter-productive’ 
and prefers an interpretation of ‘excluding or restricting’ which allows the court ‘to 
consider all the circumstances’. It is submitted that a contextual approach to 
construction brings all the circumstances into account in any event. An alternative 
two-stage process which combines ‘construction’ with ‘categorization’, employed by 
Lord Millett in Agnew v Commr of Inland Revenue [2001] UKPC 28, [2001] 2 AC 
710 at [32], runs into the problem that, unlike where the question is whether the 
transaction to be categorized is a sale or security, fixed charge or floating charge, or 
lease or licence, there is no obvious, objective legal criterion which can be use to 
distinguish a definitional clause from an exemption clause.  
